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Abstract—Security-by-Contract (S×C) is a novel paradigm
providing security assurances for mobile applications. In this
work, we present an extension of S×C enriched with an au-
tomatic trust management infrastructure. Indeed, we enhance
the already existing architecture by adding new modules and
configurations for contracts managing. At deploy-time, our
system decides the run-time configuration depending on the
credentials of the contract provider. Roughly, the run-time
environment can both enforce a security policy and monitor
the declared contract. According to the actual behaviour of
the running program our architecture updates the trust level
associated with the contract provider. The main advantage of
this method is an automatic management of the level of trust
of software and contract releasers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Java applications (MIDlets) offer a clear example
of fixed trust relationship. As a matter of fact, a MIDlet is
a software released by some vendor that clients download
and install on their device. The serious constraints on the
resources of mobile devices (e.g., CPU, memory, battery)
make several security mechanisms practically infeasible. The
current technique for providing security assurances to mobile
device users is based on software certification. Roughly,
certification authorities (CAs) provide software develop-
ers/releasers with signed certificates. Software companies
acquire certificates having a temporary validity and use
them for signing their applications. When installing a signed
MIDlet, the user’s system checks if the attached certificate
is valid and which CA released it. If the certificate source
is trusted, the application can run and access local resources
with no restrictions, otherwise the user is alerted about the
potential danger deriving from installing the MIDlet and
required for providing explicit permission to each single
access operation.
The set of trusted CAs can be statically defined, i.e.,
the device manufacturer specifies a unmodifiable list of
accepted certificates sources, or user-modifiable, i.e., users
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can add and remove CAs from the list. The certificate-based
approach has several, well known drawbacks. Mainly, it
implements a white list strategy. While certified MIDlets
have all the privileges they need, uncertified applications
have very little access to the system independently from
their actual behaviour, leading to a significant reduction of
their usability. On the other hand, executing a malicious,
signed application can have obvious, dramatic consequences.
There are many ways in which this attack can take place. A
simple attacking scenario is based on the user’s unawareness
about security. Indeed, a device owner wanting to install
a MIDlet could decide to insert its CA among the trusted
ones. This scenario is becoming popular, for instance, with
local providers offering small, contextual applications (e.g.,
catalogues, interactive guides). Often, MIDlet spots dispatch
unsigned or self-certified applications to users moving inside
some area of interest (e.g., a museum).
Another danger arises from the hierarchical structure of
certificates. In fact, when purchasing a certificate, the owner
is often authorized to produce and distribute sub-certificates.
The features of a sub-certificate depend on the structure
of the original one (e.g., a certificate can generate sub-
certificates with an expiration date lower or equal to its
own). For instance, an attacker acquiring a certificate can use
it for signing a malicious MIDlet. Then, after detecting the
attack, it should be possible, analysing the certificate, to trace
back the certificate history and discover what went wrong
in the sub-certificates chain. However, this is a reactive
approach that can lead to identifying misbehaving entities
(CAs, developers, vendors), while, in general, a proactive
solution would be preferable.
For these reasons we advocate a contract-based approach
for mobile applications trust management. In our model
contracts are in charge of providing guarantees on the
correct behaviour of programs. Contracts are automatically
produced by any provider and attached to the code. The
counterpart of contracts are security policies. Policies define
which behaviours are considered to be safe. To implement
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this strategy, we present a contract monitoring framework
responsible for verifying whether a running application
respects its contract. When an attack, namely an attempt to
violate a contract, is detected, our system reacts immediately
by enforcing a security policy and preventing the attack from
being actually performed. Moreover, a contract breaking
causes an automatic modification of the trust relationship
between the device and the authority providing the contract.
In this way, our system can immediately react to threats
and prevent further attacks coming for the same source.
Furthermore, the proposed framework offers a high degree
of flexibility providing applications clients with a reliability
feedback and assuring security guarantees also under perva-
sive, contextual mobility conditions.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II recalls
some background notions. Section III presents our proposed
extension of the security by contract paradigm with trust
measurement. Section IV relates our contribution to previ-
ous ones already in literature and Section V provides the
conclusion of the paper and our future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we recall some notions about the Security-
by-Contract paradigm [1].
A. Security-by-Contract paradigm
The Security-by-Contract (S×C) [1] paradigm provides
a full characterisation of the contract-based interaction.
Roughly, the code released by a provider is annotated with
a contract. When a client receives an application verifies
whether the code and the contract actually match by an
evidence checking procedure. If the check fails then the user
can decide to delete the MIDlet or to enforce a security
policy on it by exploiting the monitoring infrastructure.
Otherwise, the system can proceed to verify whether the
contract (correctly representing the application) satisfies the
user’s policy. Once again, if this step fails the solution
consists in enforcing the active policy on the execution.
Finally, if the previous checks were positively passed, the
MIDlet can be executed with no active runtime monitor.
The Contract-Policy matching function ensures that any
security relevant behaviour allowed by the contract is also
allowed by the policy. This matching could be done w.r.t.
different behavioural relation, e.g., language inclusion [2] or
simulation relation [3]. This matching function allows the
user that is going to execute the MIDlet to understand if the
behaviour of the applet itself is compliant with the set of
policies he has on his device or not without running it.
The enforcing approach has been shown to be feasible
on mobile devices. In particular two techniques have been
detailed in the literature and exploited for experiments and
tools: JVM customization [4] and bytecode in-lining [5].
Briefly, the first replace the standard JVM with a modified
one dispatching signals to the monitoring agent whenever a
program makes a call to (a subset of) the system APIs. The
second instruments the sequence of bytecode instructions
with invocations to the security policy monitor making the
program send security signals at run-time. Both approaches
use an external component, namely a Policy Decision Point
(PDP), holding the set of rules that compose the security
policy. Moreover the PDP reads the current device state
(battery consumption, link strength, available credit) through
dedicated internal components. When the PDP receives a
request for an action violating the security policy, it answers
denying the necessary permission. Then, the system reacts
by throwing an exception.
B. Trust management
Trust management techniques are used in systems where
some level of uncertainty exists upon components behaviour.
In case of mobile platforms, a user downloading an unknown
application can not demonstrate a knowledge of its be-
haviour prior to execution. Hence, trustworthy applications
guarantee a correct behaviour with respect to user’s security
policy and can be authorized to access a mobile device.
Schneider et al. [6] outlined the axiomatic, analytic, and
synthetic basis to measure application’s trust value.
Axiomatic trust is based on security assertions done by
trusted principals about the application. This is a classi-
cal scenario for mobile platforms where applications are
accompanied with certificates signed by some principals.
The comprehensive model of axiomatic trust management
for mobile devices was presented in [7]. The model im-
plemented a role-based trust management framework [8]
and assumed a delegation of authority to issue security
assertions. Each security assertion was supplemented with
a weight expressing quantitative trust put by the issuer
on the assertion. For instance, the assertion, encoded as
A.f(v)← D, states that principal A trusts D for performing
functionality f with degree v, where v ∈ [0; 1]. Principals
could form more complex assertions using RT syntax, for
example, containment and delegation assertions, etc. Due to
transitive and distributed model of authority, the approach
allows to deduce principal’s trustworthiness without having
direct relations. For example, a user can reason to exe-
cute an application having three assertions. The first states
that a principal A guarantees application’s trustworthiness
A.trusted(vA) ← MIDletx; the second constitutes that a
principal B knows A, B.trusted(vB)← A; and, finally, the
user trusts the principal B, User.trusted(vU ) ← B. The
resulting trust weight assigned by the user to the application
is a multiplication of trust weights in the delegation chain,
User.trusted(vA · vB · vU ) ← MIDletx. The approach
in [7] provided an algorithm to calculate trust weights but
nothing was said on the adjustment of weights in assertions.
Obviously, the axiomatic trust has pros and cons. The
main drawback is that it deals with assertions about the
history of previous interactions and does not guarantee a
in
ria
-0
05
36
70
5,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
6 
No
v 
20
10
trustworthy behaviour of the principal after granting the
access. Analytic trust persuades to trust certain behaviours of
a principal in the future using some analysis. We consider
a security-by-contract as the best example of the analytic
trust. A contract contains a specification of application’s
behaviour which can be easily verified by the user before
the real execution.
Syntactic trust addresses a run-time monitoring of un-
known applications. Thus, the application execution is al-
lowed but constrained by a security policy. Accesses vi-
olating the security policy are forbidden and the monitor
terminates application’s execution.
To the best of our knowledge, a union of these aspects
of trust was never addressed in the previous work. The
traditional approach concerns on axiomatic trust only, while
the S3MS project introduces analytic and syntactic trust
models. Instead, we employ all these aspects of trust to
reason on application’s trustworthiness, and we are also
interested in how these aspects of trust co-exist and influence
on each other in the context of mobile platforms.
III. OUR GOAL
The main novelty of our approach consists in integrating
the S×C paradigm with a monitoring infrastructure for trust
management by exploiting Role-based Trust Management
Language (RTML) to deal with both trust and reputation
management. In particular we aim at automatizing the up-
dating of the trust relationship between users and appli-
cation/contract providers. As a matter of fact, one crucial
point of the S×C architecture is the checking of the relation
that exists between the applet and its contract. Nowadays
the mobile code is run if its origin is trusted. This means
that we can only reject or accept the signature of the
application/contract provider.
Here we propose an extension of the existing architecture
by adding a component for the contract monitoring that
allows us to check if the execution of the application adheres
to the contract of the application itself and, according to the
answer, we update the level of trust of the provider.
Our strategy takes place in two phases: at deploy-time
by setting the monitoring state and at run-time by applying
the contract monitoring procedure for adjusting the provider
trust level.
A. Deployment Architecture
The S×C paradigm works according the Applica-
tion/Service Life-Cycle depicted in Fig. 1. The users have a
device on which they apply their own security definition by
designing personal policies or retrieving them from some
provider, e.g., the device manufacturer. When he down-
loads an application the system automatically checks the
formal correspondence between code and contract (Check
Evidence). This step is intended to provide a formal proof
that the contract effectively denotes every possible behaviour
Figure 1: The Security-by-Contract Application life-
cycle [9].
of the running program. This step can be implemented, for
instance, using the model-carrying code [10] method.
If the result is negative then the monitor runs to enforce
the policy (Enforce Policies), otherwise a matching between
the contract and the policy is performed to establish if the
contract is compliant with the policy. If it is the case than
the application is executed (Execute Application), otherwise
the policy is enforced again (Enforce Policies).
This security model does not require the software provider
to be a trusted entity and simply relies on the correctness
of local, internal components (i.e., Check Evidence and
Contract-Policy Matching). Here, we deploy this model with
Figure 2: The Extended Security-by-Contract Application
life-cycle.
a framework with quantitative trust in such a way that it is
possible to update the level of trust dynamically according to
the adherence between the real execution of the application
and its contract. As matter of fact we extend the existing
architecture by adding a contract monitoring that checks the
compliance between the application and its contract. Hence
the extended Application/Service Life-Cycle results as in
Fig. 2. In fact we replace the component Check Evidence
by a Trusted Provider that decides according to the level of
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trust of the provider. If the provider is untrusted then the
policy is enforced, otherwise the contract-policy matching
is performed.
Two new scenarios arise:
1) The contract satisfies the policy. In this case, even if
it is not useful for policy enforcement, we monitor
the contract on a statistical basis. If the contract is
satisfied we report ‘OK’ and the level of trust remains
unchanged. Otherwise, if the contract is violated we
report a trust violation and we continue to monitor
the policy (the policy starts at the end of the recorded
sequence of states monitored).
2) The contract does not satisfy the policy. Firstly, we
check if the application adheres to the contract. If
it is not the case, we directly enforce the policy,
otherwise both the contract monitoring and the policy
enforcement are performed at the same time.
Let us notice that, in the second scenario, the verification
component plays a central role. Indeed, a negative result
denotes that a trusted provider released a fake contract.
Clearly, this event means that the previous trust value must
be updated. Moreover, this component could be missing or
unavailable (e.g., due to the limited device resources). In this
case we reduce ourselves to the mixed (i.e., monitoring and
enforcing) scenario.
B. Trust adjustment via contract monitoring
We outline how trust measures assigned to security as-
sertions can be adjusted as a result of a contract moni-
toring strategy. Indeed, trust measures associated with the
provider concern on the contract goodness mainly. Updated
trust measures will influence on future interactions with
an application and contract providers. In other words, our
system penalizes the provider more when the contract does
not specify application’s behaviour correctly, rather when
the application itself contradicts user’s security policy.
Here we present a possible extension of the monitoring
infrastructure model proposed in [5] by making the pol-
icy decision point (PDP) also responsible for the contract
monitoring operations and for the trust vector updating.
Roughly, in [5] a monitoring infrastructure consists in a PDP
that holds the actual security state and is responsible for
accepting or refusing new actions and Policy enforcement
points (PEPs) that are both in charge of intercepting actions
to be dispatched to the PDP and preventing the execution of
not allowed operations.
Starting from this model, we extend it by making the
PDP also responsible for the contract monitoring operations
and for the trust vector updating. According to [4], [5],
we assume that both contracts and policies are specified
through the same formalism. Hence, the policy enforcement
configuration of the PDP keeps unchanged. The PDP must
load application contracts as well as security policies dynam-
ically. Moreover, it must be able to run under three different
execution scenarios (Fig. 2): policy enforcement enabled,
contract monitoring enabled or both.
The base enforcement scenario (execution scenario 1) is
actually unchanged w.r.t. the standard usage of the classical
PDP. Hence, no contract monitoring nor trust management
operations are involved.
Main interest resides in the other two scenarios. The
contract monitoring scenario applies to programs carrying a
contract released by a trusted authority (see Section III-A).
Similarly to the policy enforcement strategy, PEPs send
event signals to the PDP. The main difference is that the PDP
keeps in memory the program events trace. When a signal
arrives, the PDP checks whether it is consistent with the
monitored contract. If the contract is respected then the PDP
updates its internal monitoring state and answers allowing
the operation. Otherwise, if a violation attempt happens, the
PDP reacts changing its state.
The first consequence of a contract violation is a de-
creasing of the trust weights of both, direct and transitive
security assertions. Indeed, the contract monitor detected
a fake execution of a trusted application w.r.t. its declared
contract.
Secondly, the PDP changes from contract monitoring to
policy enforcement configuration. Since an instance of the
policy is always present, this operation does not imply a
serious computational overhead. Afterwards, the policy state
is updated using the execution trace recorded during the
monitoring phase. This step, that can be time consuming,
is necessary for verifying whether, breaking the contract,
the application has also violated the policy. However, this
computational cost, being the consequence of an extraor-
dinary event, must be paid at most once. Indeed, when
the PDP is performing both contract monitoring and policy
enforcement, the current policy state is known. Finally,
the execution continues with the PDP enforcing the policy
starting from the last action, that is the event breaking the
contract. Figure 3 shows the behaviour of the PDP per-
forming the contract monitoring task in the two previously
discussed scenarios.
Summing up, both execution scenario 2 and 3 check
contract violations through the contract monitoring strategy
described above and update providers’ trust level. Such
updates will influence future interactions with applications
and contract providers. Trust measures associated with the
provider concern on the contract goodness mainly. In other
words, our system penalizes the provider more when the
contract does not specify application’s behaviour correctly,
rather when the application itself contradicts user’s security
policy. Quantitative representation of this adjustment we
consider to present in the future work.
IV. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there is not much work
about the integration of trust management and policy en-
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(a) Scenario 2 (b) Scenario 3
Figure 3: The contract monitoring configurations
forcement for mobile code in literature. However, works
about the integration of trust module into policy enforcement
exist. In particular some work has been done for integrating
trust management and fine grained access control in Grid
Architecture. An attempt can be found in [11] where it is
proposed an access control system the enhances the Globus
toolkit with a number of features. This copes with the fact
that access control policies and access rights management
becomes one of the main bottleneck using Globus for sharing
resource in a Grid architecture. Along this line of research
[12] presents an integrated architecture, extending the pre-
vious one, with an inference engine managing reputation
and trust credentials. This framework is extended again in
[13] where it is introduced a mechanism for trust negotiating
credential to overcome scalability problem. In this way
the framework provided preserves privacy credentials and
security policy of both users and providers. Even if the
application scenario and the implementation are different,
the basic idea consists in considering the trust as a metrics
for deciding the reliability of an application provider.
Also [14] presents a reputation mechanism to facilitate
the trustworthiness evaluation of entities in ubiquitous com-
puting environments. It is based on probability theory and
supports reputation evolution and propagation. The proposed
reputation mechanism is also implemented as part of a
QoS-aware Web service discovery middleware and evaluated
regarding its overhead on service discovery latency. On the
contrary, our approach is not probabilistic. We provide a
method according to which we update the level of trust of
an application provider.
Four main approaches to mobile code security can be
broadly identified in the literature.
The sandbox model [15] limits the instructions available
for use, with the weakness that it provides security only
at the cost of unduly restricting the functionality of mobile
code (e.g., the code is not permitted to access any files).
The sandbox model has been subsequently extended in Java
2 [16], where permissions available for programs from a
code source are specified through a security policy.
Cryptographic code-signing is used for certifying the
origin (i.e. the producer) of mobile code and its integrity,
typically by means of private/public keys to sign/verify the
executable content. Several limitations of this approach can
be identified [17]. A key weakness is that in the signing
process it is not checked at all if the application is doing
things not wanted by the user e.g., sending data with infor-
mation the user does not want to be sent (F-Secure Weblog
(www.f-secure.com/weblog) 11/05/2007, “Just because it’s
Signed doesn’t mean it isn’t spying on you”).
The Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) approach [18] enables
safe execution of code from untrusted sources by requiring
a producer to furnish a proof regarding the safety of mobile
code. Then the code consumer uses a proof validator to
check, that the proof is valid and hence the foreign code
is safe to execute. The PCC approach is problematic for
several reasons [19], such as that automatic proof generation
for complex properties is still a daunting problem, making
the PCC approach not suitable for real mobile applications.
The Model-Carrying Code (MCC) approach is strongly
inspired by PCC, sharing with it the idea that untrusted
code is accompanied by additional information that aids
in verifying its safety [10]. With MCC, this additional
information takes the form of a model that captures the
security-relevant behaviour of code, rather than a proof.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a contract-based trust manage-
ment framework for mobile applications. At deploy-time,
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the monitoring structure is decided depending on both the
application contract and the credentials (i.e., trust measure)
of the contract releaser. The main novelty of our model
consists in the contract monitoring scenario. At run-time,
a trusted program violating its contract leads to a correction
of the trust relationship with the provider and activates the
policy enforcement configuration of our system.
Many future directions are viable. Mainly our trust man-
agement strategy is still a work in progress. Currently, trust
weights can only decrease monotonically as a consequence
of contract violations with the only exception of a direct
intervention of the user. Also the contracting infrastructure
can be further improved. As a matter of fact, in this work
we only referred to single-contract applications. However,
we can extend our model in order to accept more contract
instances for a single program. This scenario seems to be
realistic and open new directions of investigation.
Finally, similarly to [5], we plan to implement a working
prototype for testing the practical feasibility of our approach.
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